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WHAT WE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: ON KEITH 
WHITTINGTON’S REPUGNANT LAWS 
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS 
OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE 
PRESENT. By Keith E. Whittington.1 University Press of 
Kansas. 2019. Pp. xxi + 410. $39.95 (Cloth). 
Leslie F. Goldstein2 
Keith Whittington’s new book, Repugnant Laws, provides a 
comprehensive overview and quantitative analysis of all the times 
the U.S. Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a 
federal statute (a practice termed “horizontal judicial review”). 
As one has come to expect from this author, it is a fine piece of 
research, elegantly presented, and certainly worth a read by all 
who teach Constitutional Law. Some of what it has to tell us is 
familiar, but much is new. 
I. THE BIG PICTURE 
Here is the big picture as it emerges in the book. Before 1920, 
few federal laws were struck down or constitutionally restricted 
via Supreme Court interpretation. Over its first 130-year period, 
these judicial restrictions of Congress averaged just under one per 
year (pp. 27–28). In the years from 1920 through 1932 this number 
jumped to average 3.1 per year. During the peak activism of the 
anti-New-Deal Court, from 1933 through 1936, the Court struck 
down as many as five federal statutory provisions per year. The 
well-known “switch in time” during FDR’s second term began 
nearly two decades of exceptional quiescence toward federal laws 
wherein the post-New-Deal Court of 1937–1954 returned nearly 
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all the way back to its pre-1920 levels, averaging around one 
restriction of federal statutory provision per year (p. 179, Table 6-
1). 
After this, the numbers inch upward: Warren Court activism 
against Congress rose back up nearly to Taft Court levels, with 2.6 
restrictions per year; the Burger Court took it a bit past the Taft 
Court, to 3.17 per year; the Rehnquist Court kicked it up to 3.6 
per year; then the Roberts Court through 2017 sharply cut back 
on the level of overturnings/judicial restrictions to just about two 
federal laws per year, below the Warren Court level (p. 238, Table 
7-1). Departing sharply from previous Court practice, the Roberts 
Court upheld even fewer federal laws than it struck down. 
An important fact, quantified for the first time in this book, 
is that the Supreme Court has used its power of judicial review far 
more often to strengthen, rather than cut back on, Congress’s 
legislating power. On average, three out of every four times that 
the Supreme Court reviewed a provision of federal law, it upheld, 
rather than voiding or providing a restricting interpretation of, the 
provision at issue (p. 25). 
In terms of the big normative picture (i.e., looking at the 
question of whether the Court is ultimately an impediment to a 
well-functioning democracy), Whittington finds that it is not easy 
to find a theory that justifies horizontal judicial review, wherein 
the Court blocks a concerted policy commitment of nationally 
elected officials, but also he notices the rarity of such a practice. 
Instead, the Supreme Court “is often doing the political work that 
some political leaders want it to do. It is acting as a player within 
democratic politics, not simply as an institutional guardian 
standing outside of democratic politics” (p. 314, emphasis added). 
But he qualifies this description, using a metaphor: “The Supreme 
Court is not a lapdog; it has often bitten the hand of the party that 
put it on the bench” (p. 291). I would add the metaphor deployed 
by Martin Shapiro for constitutional courts: Management 
sometimes puts in place a “junkyard dog,” knowing that the 
animal’s general ferociousness will cause it to keep in line 
potential miscreants, even at the risk that such a dog will 
occasionally also nip at its own patron.3 
 
 3. Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice: Of Institutions and Democracy, 
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II. INTERESTING FACTOIDS 
Repugnant Laws is chockful of interesting factoids that most 
of us constitutional law professors did not know before: e.g., in its 
first 72 years of operation (up to the Civil War), the Supreme 
Court reviewed Congressional legislation 62 times, and in 22 of 
those cases either restricted potential applications of the law on 
constitutional grounds or declared part of the law void for 
unconstitutionality (p. 62). Marbury was not the first such 
instance; it was the third (p. 81). 
Second, the post-Civil-War Supreme Court contrasts with the 
Court of its first 72 years in that antebellum Justices tended to 
review laws from the earliest Congresses—Congresses of the 
relatively distant past—whereas the Reconstruction and post-
Reconstruction courts under Chief Justices Chase and Waite 
focused primarily on legislation of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction Congresses. As the Republican Party split into 
radical and liberal factions, the Supreme Court of Republican 
appointees became a player siding with one or another faction of 
the still dominant Republican coalition (pp. 122–123). 
Third, in a 1907 case Ellis v. United States,4 the Court upheld 
a federal law requiring all federal contractors to provide an eight-
hour work day (p. 170); this was two years after Lochner5 and a 
year before Muller v. Oregon.6 Perhaps the Court had abandoned 
its Lochner thinking even before hearing the argument about 
women that we professors had thought was what swayed them in 
Muller. 
Fourth, whereas I have always thought of the “Lochner era” 
as running from the late 1890s through 1936, Whittington 
periodizes Lochner as running from 1885–1919, and informs us 
that even in this period the Court upheld far more Congressional 
statutes than it struck down (pp. 25–26). This fact of judicial 
support for federal laws also holds for what he calls the Taft Court 
period of 1920–1932, and even for the anti-New-Deal Court of 
1933–1936 (pp. 25–26, Figure 1-1). 
Fifth, certain courts stand out from the rest. The anti-New-
Deal Court (of 1933–1936) stands out as extremely 
obstructionist—whether measured in number of provisions struck 
 
 4. Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907).  
 5. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 6. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
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down, in number of whole laws struck down, in number of notable 
laws struck down, or in the recent-ness of the laws that were struck 
down (pp. 178–180, Table 6-1). The Roberts Court of 2005–2018 
has been unique in not upholding more federal laws than it struck 
down. No prior Supreme Court over 200 years has produced this 
pattern (p. 269). On average, the Supreme Court has upheld three 
times as many laws as they struck down. 
As the anti-New-Deal Court of 1933–1936 was uniquely 
obstructionist, so the pro-New Deal Court of October 1936 to 
June 1942 was uniquely compliant with Congress. One extreme 
begat another. In five of those six terms (October 1936–June 
1942), the Court struck down no provision of a federal law and 
over these six terms the Court upheld federal laws against 81 
challenges to them (p. 209). 
Of the Warren Court, Whittington observes a distinction 
between its treatment of federal law and state law found 
repugnant to the Constitution. In cases examining problematic 
federal law, the Warren Court typically, rather than simply strike 
it down, would read the law, irrespective of its actual wording, in 
a way that rendered it compatible with the Bill of Rights provision 
that had given rise to the court challenge (pp. 221, 229, 237). A 
prominent example of this judicial approach with which many of 
us might be familiar is the United States. v. Seeger7 conscientious 
objector case. What one may not have known prior to reading this 
book is that under the Warren Court this active rewriting of 
federal law in order to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality 
was more typical than outright declarations of unconstitutionality. 
The history of striking down statutes from the Civil War to 
the mid-1990s was mainly about using the Fourteenth 
Amendment to strike down state and local laws. From the mid-
1990s onward, however, the Supreme Court under Chief Justices 
Rehnquist and Roberts have voided as many federal laws as state 
laws (p. 237, Figure 7-1). This is a new phenomenon. 
III. DISAGREEMENTS 
There are a number of examples where I did not agree with 
Whittington’s interpretation of a given case or of its political 
import, but this would probably be true of my reaction to any 
 
 7. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
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comprehensive account given by any author other than myself. 
Rather than recounting my various small, particular 
disagreements, I would leave it to others to read the book and 
come up with their own. 
My most overarching disagreement would be that I am not 
convinced that the pro-New Deal Court of 1937–1942 broke with 
precedent so thoroughly that it brought about a “constitutional 
revolution,” as Whittington suggests (pp. 174–175). Or, to say it 
another way, I see the course of economy-related precedents prior 
to 1937 as having exhibited more zigzagging than he 
acknowledges. For instance, the Court allowed Congress to ban 
“impure” food or drugs from interstate commerce8 and to tax the 
shipping of yellow margarine in order to suppress interstate sales 
of it,9 but disallowed Congress to ban10 or tax the shipping across 
state lines of the products of child labor.11 The Court permitted 
Congress to regulate the business of transforming livestock to 
meat in slaughterhouses, because the business fell within the 
“current of commerce” that flowed from one state to another,12 
and, on similar grounds, to regulate the local stockyards where 
such livestock was held prior to slaughter.13 On the other hand, 
the Court forbade Congress to regulate the slaughtering of 
poultry that had crossed state lines in order to be slaughtered.14 
Although the Court declared in 1914 that “in all matters having 
such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce . . . 
that the government of the one involves the control of the other, 
it is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the 
final and dominant rule,”15 the anti-New Deal Court, nonetheless, 
forbade Congress to regulate working conditions in the 
nationwide coal-mining industry in order to stabilize interstate 
commerce in coal.16 When the Court in 1937 opted to go with the 
pro-Congressional-power zigs rather than the anti-Congressional-
power zags of this list, it was hardly wreaking revolution. 
 
 8. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911). 
 9. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904). 
 10. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 11. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922). 
 12. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
 13. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922). 
 14. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 15. Houston East & West Texas Railway Co. v. U.S. (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 
U.S. 342 (1914). 
 16. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
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My particular interpretive disagreements were often 
prompted by Whittington’s style of reporting the decisions, which 
is to follow very closely the Court’s own language. This style can 
be both a plus and a minus. On the plus side, this approach can 
provide a refreshing reminder of how different the past is from 
the present; some cases that would be seen one way today were 
described quite differently by the Court at the time. For instance, 
In re Heff17 in 1905 struck down a federal law limiting alcohol sales 
to Indians. The Supreme Court said that once Indians had become 
full American citizens under the process established by the Dawes 
Allotment Act of 1887,18 they could no longer be restricted by 
Congress any more than other citizens could. I had viewed this 
case from afar as an equal protection decision. Immersed in the 
Court’s own language, Whittington notes that in the Court’s terms 
this decision, rather than upholding Indian rights as such, upheld 
the state’s right to regulate its own citizens, free from interference 
by Congress. Controversial at the time, Heff was overruled eleven 
years later by United States v. Nice.19 
Whittington’s close-to-the-language approach, however, can 
also produce problems, including the problem of 
misrepresentation of the fundamental impact of a decision. On 
the 1842 case, Prigg v. Pennsylvania,20 Whittington quotes Justice 
Story upholding the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793: Story 
ruled “[the Act is] clearly constitutional in all its provisions, with 
the possible exception of that part which confers authority on 
state magistrates.”21 Whittington concludes: “The Court was 
consistently on the wrong side of the slavery question” (p. 117). 
But, in fact, Story also went on to say in Prigg that state 
magistrates (the term referred to low-level judges) may act to help 
Congress enforce the law “unless prohibited by state legislation.”22 
In other words, the state lawmakers may keep state officials from 
carrying out the Fugitive Slave Act, as Pennsylvania already had 
done, in direct violation of the terms of that Act. Northern states 
promptly enacted more such prohibitions, and the Fugitive Slave 
Act, as predicted in the partial dissents to Story’s ruling, became 
 
 17. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905). 
 18. Dawes Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current version at 25 
U.S.C. ch. 9, § 331–334, 339, 341–342, 348–349, 354, 381 (1994)). 
 19. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916). 
 20. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
 21. Id. at 542. 
 22. Id. (emphasis added). 
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widely unenforceable due to the paucity of federal judges (e.g., 
for all of Pennsylvania, there were only two federal judges). This 
unenforceability provoked political pressure from the South, 
which eventually led to the Compromise of 1850, wherein 
Congress created many federal magistrates to get around the 
problem that the Prigg decision had created for slaveowners. Both 
Joseph Story and his good friend Charles Sumner called the Prigg 
opinion a major blow for liberty.23 
IV. FRUITFUL REMINDERS 
Whittington’s book offers a number of fruitful reminders of 
things about judicial review that may have been pointed out 
elsewhere. For one, he usefully reminds us that Congress’s 
interpretation of the Constitution also matters. For instance, 
although the constitutionality of a federal bank was not seriously 
questioned after 1819, the broader interpretation of federal 
powers enunciated by John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland24 
became “in practice a political dead letter,” because Congress 
restrained itself to a narrow reading of its own powers from the 
time of the first Jacksonian Congress until the Civil War (p. 95). 
The book also usefully reminds us that the Missouri 
Compromise, notoriously declared unconstitutional in the Dred 
Scott decision,25 was by the time of that decision a long-defunct 
provision. The 1820 Missouri Compromise line above which 
slavery could not spread had been replaced by the Kansas 
Nebraska Act of 1854, which imposed popular sovereignty for 
allowing slavery to spread or not. 
More than once, Repugnant Laws mentions that after the 
Supreme Court had struck down a particular law (for instance, the 
legislative veto) Congress then developed an alternative “work-
around.” This is an important fact, supporting Alexander Bickel’s 
assertion26 that what generally goes on is a “colloquy” among the 
Court and the elected branches. I would have liked to see in the 
book more detailed information about the successful 
congressional responses to negative Court decisions. In a similar 
 
 23. For a far more detailed account, see Leslie F. Goldstein, A “Triumph of Freedom” 
After All? Prigg v. Pennsylvania Re-Examined, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 763, 763 (2011). 
 24. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 25. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 26. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 
91 (1970). 
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vein, the book would have benefitted from a bit of discussion of 
the movement for a Child Labor Amendment to the Constitution, 
which built up considerable momentum prior to the Court’s 
change of position on Congress’s power to regulate industrial 
labor in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin27 and U.S. v. Darby.28 
In a telling footnote (p. 364 n. 69), Whittington points out 
that Congress inadvertently probably prolonged its trouble with 
the anti-New-Deal Court justices by cutting federal retirement 
salaries in half in 1932. It restored these salaries in 1937, the same 
year as the unsuccessful Court-packing plan. Not only did 
Congress restore the salaries in that pivotal year, but it made 
available senior status to the Supreme Court, which status would 
allow salaries to rise in the future, unlike official retirement.29 Five 
of the six vacancies filled by FDR after 1936 were opened up by 
justices taking senior status. Plainly, carrots worked better than 
sticks. 
 
 27. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 28. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 29. The Retirement Act of March 1, 1937, Pub. L. No. 10, 50 Stat. 24; Minor Myers 
III, The Judicial Service of Retired United States Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. SUP. CT. 
HIST. 46, 47 nn.9–18 (2007).  
